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[39 C.2d

[L.A. No. 22246. In Bank. July 14, 1952.]

DESSIE S. RODABAUGH et al., Appellants, v. PAUL
TEKUS, Respondent.
[1] Negligence-Evidence-Last Clear Chance.-Mere fact that
evidence in a given case may be sufficient to sustain a finding
of negligence on the part of a defendant does not justify the
conclusion that such evidence is sufficient to permit application
of the last clear chance doctrine; there must, in addition, be
substantial evidence to show that defendant had a last clear
chance to avoid the accident.
[2a-2c] Automobiles-Evidence-Last Clear Chance.-In action
for wrongful death arising out of a collision of automobiles
at an intersection, evidence that both cars were approaching
the intersection at approximately the same time and at
approximately the same speed, that decedent did not reach
a point of danger from which he could not extricate himself
until he was within 60 feet of the path of defendant's car,
that defendant could assume that decedent would obey a stop
sign until decedent had arrived at a point within such distance of 60 feet, and that decedent was admittedly negligent
in not obeying the stop sign and in proceeding directly across
defendant's path without diminishing his speed of 35 to 40
miles per hour, is insufficient to warrant application of the
last clear chance doctrine in favor of plaintiffs.
[3] !d.-Last Clear Chance-Ability to Escape.-Motorist approaching an intersection is not in a position of danger,
within meaning of last clear chance doctrine, until he arrives
at a point at which he can no longer stop or slow down in
time to avoid a collision.
[4] !d.-Assumption by Motorist as to Conduct of Others.-.A
motorist on a through highway had the right to assume that
another motorist approaching an intersection from a side
road possessed normal faculties, and that he saw stop warnings which were directly within the range of his vision.
[5] !d.-Last Clear Chance-Collision of Moving Vehicles.-Doctrine of last clear chance should not be applied in a case
involving a collision of moving vehicles where the act creating
the peril occurs practically simultaneously with the happening of the accident and where neither party can fairly be
said to have had a last clear chance thereafter to avoid the
consequences.
[1] See Car.Jur., Negligence,§ 80; Am.Jur., Negligence,§ 215.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Negligence, § 148; [2] Automobiles,
§ 271; [3, 5] Automobiles,§ 152; [4] Automobiles, § 80; [6] Negligence, § 48.
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[6] Negligence-Last Clear Chance.-To relieve a plaintiff of his
own negligence it is not enough that defendant may have had
a chance to avoid the accident, but defendant must have had
the last chance and also had a clear chance to do so by the
exercise of ordinary care; this implies that his chance to
avoid the accident must have come later in point of time than
any similar chance on the part of the injured person, and that
he must have had more than a bare possible chance to avoid
an unexpected peril created practically simultaneously with
the happening of the accident by the negligence of the injured
party.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange
County. Raymond Thompson, Judge . .Affirmed.
Action for damages for wrongful death as result of an
automobile collision. Judgment for defendant notwithstanding
verdict for plaintiffs, affirmed.
Elmer R. Guy, Hirson & Horn and 'rheodore .A. Horn for
Appellants.
Robert .A. Cushman for Respondent.
SPENCE, J.-Plaintiffs, the widow and adult sons of
.Andrew C. Rodabaugh, brought this action to recover damages for the latter's death as a result of an automobile collision. Following the denial of defendant's motion for a
directed verdict, the jury returned a verdict in plaintiffs' favor
for $2,500. Defendant then moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The trial court granted this motion,
and judgment was entered in defendant's favor. On this
appeal, plaintiffs challenge the correctness of this ruling.
Plaintiffs conceded in the trial court and now concede
that the deceased was guilty of negligence in the operation
of his own automobile, and that his negligence contributed
to his death. However, the trial court instructed the jury
on the doctrine of last clear chance. Defendant maintains
that the evidence was insufficient to sustain plaintiffs' recovery on that theory, and that the trial court properly
so determined in granting his motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to plaintiffs, with every legitimate inference
drawn in their favor (Neel v. Mannings, Inc., 19 Cal.2d 647,
649-650 [122 P.2d 576] ; Champion v. Bennetts, 37 Cal.2d
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815, 820 [236 P.2d 155] ; Shannon v. Thomas, 57 Cal.App.2d
187, 192-193 [134 P.2d 522] ), defendant's position must
nevertheless be sustained.
·
There is no material conflict in the evidence. The only
eyewitnesses were defendant and his passenger. Plaintiffs
called defendant under section 2055 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, and they base their claims upon the testimony
elicited from him. Defendant called his passenger a:s a defense witness, and his testimony substantially corroborated
that of defendant.
The accident occurred in Orange County about 7 :20 a. m.
on August 24, 1948, at the intersection of Bolsa Street,
an east and west state highway, and Golden West Avenue,
a county road running north and south. Both roadways
are approximately 20 feet wide and are paved, but with soft,
sandy shoulders on both sides of the pavement. There are
ditches on either side of Golden West Avenue. The view
of the intersection is unobstructed from all sides, and at
the time of the accident, there was a slight fog with visibility
about 500 feet. Bolsa Street, on which defendant was traveling, is a through highway, and at the north and south approaches to it from Golden West A venue there are regulation stop signs. (Veh. Code, § 471.) In addition, the word
"stop" and a white stop line are painted across the northbound traffic lane of Golden West A venue a few feet south
of Bolsa Street. There also is a wavering white line crossing and recrossing the white center line of Golden West
A venue for approximately 300 feet south of the intersection.
Decedent was driving north on Golden West A venue at
35 to 40 miles per hour, and defendant was driving west
on Bolsa Street at approximately 40 miles per hour. When
defendant first observed decedent, each of the automobiles
was approximately 500 feet from the intersection. Decedent
subsequently failed to heed the stop warnings, and continued
into the intersection to the point of impact without slackening his speed.
Defendant testified that he continued to watch decedent's
car; that when defendant was some 75 to 100 feet from
the intersection and saw that decedent was not slowing
down, he started to apply his brakes gently, thinking that
decedent would probably stop ; that as decedent approached,
he appeared to be looking straight ahead and did not slacken
his speed at any time before the impact occurred; that when
decedent did not slow down, defendant applied his brakes
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harder at about 75 feet from the intersection, and at a
distance of 35 feet he slammed them on, leaving skid marks
on the pavement. Defendant further testified that traveling at 40 miles per hour, he could have stopped his car in
approximately 60 feet. Defendant did not turn to the right
or left before the impact, and his car struck decedent's car
on the right side at the rear door and wheel. The collision
occurred in the northeast quadrant of the intersection. When
the vehicles came to rest, decedent's car was in a ditch near
the northwest corner of the intersection, some 39 feet from
the point of impact, and defendant's car was some 25 feet
west of said point facing east.
The parties are agreed on the necessary elements which
must be present in order to warrant the application of the
last clear chance doctrine. These elements were stated by
this court in Girdner v. Union Oil Co., 216 Cal. 197, 202
[13 P.2d 915], and were recently reiterated in Belinsky v.
Olsen, 38 Cal.2d 102, 104 [237 P.2d 645], and Peterson
v. Burkhalter, 38 Cal.2d 107, 109 [237 P.2d 977]. The
real dispute between the parties here involves the question
of whether there is any substantial evidence to meet all
the essential requirements for the application of that doctrine.
Plaintiffs contend that there is such evidence in the record
before us. Defendant concedes that the evidence is sufficient
to establish that decedent through his own negligence placed
himself in a position of danger, and that prior to the occurrence of the collision defendant had actual knowledge of
that fact. Defendant contends, however, that there is no substantial evidence to show that after defendant acquired knowledge of decedent's perilous situation, he had a clear chance
to avoid the collision by the exercise of ordinary care or
that he failed to exercise such care.
[1] In discussing the contentions of the parties, it is
important to bear in mind that the mere fact that the evidence in a given case may be sufficient to sustain a finding
of negligence on the part of a defendant does not justify
the conclusion that such evidence is sufficient to permit the
application of the last clear chance doctrine. Negligence
is but one of the several elements involved in said doctrine,
and reliance on the doctrine presupposes negligence on the
part of both parties. In addition, however, there must be
substantial evidence to show that defendant had a last
clear chance to avoid the accident. (Dalley v. Williams, 73
Cal.App.2d 427, 433 [166 P.2d 595] ; Berton v. Cochran, 81
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Cal.App.2d 776, 779[185 P.2d 349]; De Vore v. Faris, 88
Cal.App.2d 576, 583 [199 P.2d 391] .)
[2a] We may assume without deciding that there is sufficient evidence to sustain a finding of some negligence on
the part of defendant, despite the fact that he was traveling
on a through highway and was entitled to assume until the
contrary was apparent, that decedent would obey the law
and would not drive his car past the stop sign directly
into the path of defendant's car. (V eh. Code, §§ 552, 577;
Dickinson v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, 55 Cal.App.2d 824,
827 [ 131 P .2d 401].) However, the evidence is insufficient
to support a finding that after defendant discovered decedent's peril, he had a last clear chance to avoid the collision. The fact that defendant saw that decedent was looking straight ahead while decedent was traveling approximately 500 feet in approaching the intersection does not
establish that decedent was in a position of danger this entire
distance. [3] Decedent was not in a position of danger until
he arrived at a point at which he could no longer stop
or slow down in time to avoid a collision. (Dalley v. Williams, sup,ra, 73 Oal.App.2d 427,435; also, Yo~mg v. Southern
Pac. Co., 182 Cal. 369, 380-381 [190 P. 36].) [4] Defendant
had the right to assume that decedent possessed normal
faculties, and that he saw the stop warnings which were
directly within the range of his vision. (Folger v. Richfield Oil Corp., 80 Cal.App.2d 655, 660-661[182 P.2d 337].)
Plaintiffs set forth the respective speeds and distances
found in the testimony, and then argue by a series of mathematical calculations that such evidence is sufficient to support
a finding that defendant had a last clear chance to avoid
the accident. In our view this argument is without merit.
Under any view of the testimony it is clear that both cars
were approaching the intersection at approximately the same
time and at approximately the same speed. Disregarding
for the moment the fact that defendant was traveling on
the through highway and decedent was traveling on a road
which was plainly marked with stop warnings, it is ap-.
parent that this case presents the picture of one of the
usual types of intersection collisions between two rapidly
moving vehicles. It has been frequently stated that the last
clear chance doctrine is ordinarily inapplicable under such
conditions. (Poncino v. Reid-Murdock & Co., 136 Cal.App.
223, 232 [28 P.2d 932] ; also Johnson v. Sacramento Northern
Ry., 54 Cal.App.2d 528, 532 [129 P.2d 503] ; Dalley v. Wil-
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liams, supra, 73 Cal.A.pp.2d 427, 436; Folger v. Richfield Oil
Corp., supra, 80 Cal.A.pp.2d 655, 660; Berton v. Cochran,
supra, 81 Cal.A.pp.2d 776, 781; Allin v. Snavely, 100 Cal.
A.pp.2d 411, 415 [224 P.2d 113] .)
[5] As was said in Poncino v. Reid-Mttrdock & Co., supra,
at page 232: ''Like many other cases involving collisions
between moving vehicles, the accident may be said to have
happened within the twinkling of an eye after the first
indication of danger. While the doctrine of last clear chance
has been applied in certain exceptional cases involving collisions between moving vehicles, we are of the opinion that
it should not be applied to the ordinary case in which the
act creating the peril occurs practically simultaneously with
the happening of the accident and in which neither party
can fairly be said to have had a last clear chance thereafter
to avoid the consequences. To apply the doctrine to such
cases would be equivalent to denying the existence of the
general rule which makes contributory negligence a bar
to recovery."
[2b] Certain phases of plaintiffs' argument should be
mentioned. Plaintiffs rely heavily upon defendant's testimony to the effect that he could have stopped within a distance of 60 feet while traveling at 40 miles per hour. There
is no other testimony in the record relating to the distance
required to stop a car by the application of brakes. As
plaintiffs accept this testimony, it appears therefrom that
decedent did not reach a point of danger from which he
could not extricate himself until he was within 60 feet of
the path of defendant's car ; and that defendant could assume that decedent would obey the stop sign until decedent
had arrived at a point within such distance of 60 feet. A.
vehicle traveling at a speed of 40 miles per hour travels
approximately 60 feet per second, and plaintiffs do not dispute
the fact that defendant's total time for reaction and effective
action after discovering decedent's perilous situation was
neces,;ari]y somewhere between 1 :1,4_ and 13,0 seconds. Plaintiffs' calculations do not sustain their position. A.s was said
in St. Lonis S.W. R11. Co. v. Sirnpson, 286 U.S. 346, at page
351 [52 S.Ct. 520, 76 L.Ed. 1152] : "Calculations so 11ice are
unavailing to prove anything except the unity of the wJ10le
transaction. The Reveral acts of negligence were too closely
welded together in time as well as in quality to be viewed
as independent."
[6] In Ponm:no v. Reid-Murdock & Co., supra, 136 Cal.
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App. 223, at page 227, it was further said: "In other words,
it is not enough to relieve a plaintiff of his own negligence
that the defendant may have had a chance to avoid the accident, but defendant must have had the last chance and also
had a clear chance to do so by the exercise of ordinary care.
That he should have had the last chance implies that his
chance to avoid the accident must have come later in point of
time than any similar chance on the part of the injured
person. That he should have had a clear chance implies that
he must have had more than a bare possible chance to avoid
an unexpected peril created practically simultaneously with
the happening of the accident by the negligence of the injured
party."
Plaintiffs also argue that defendant acted negligently in
not turning to the right or left to avoid the collision. We
have heretofore assumed, solely for the purpose of this discussion, that there was sufficient evidence to sustain a finding
of some negligence on the part of defendant. As above indicated, this does not suffice to bring into operation the last
clear chance doctrine. [2c] In passing it may be stated, however, that defendant was admittedly traveling on a narrow
through road 20 feet in width with soft shoulders on either
side; that he was approaching a narrow, intersecting road
with ditches on either side thereof; and that decedent was
admittedly negligent in not obeying the stop sign and in
proceeding directly across defendant's path without diminishing his speed of 35 to 40 miles per hour. Plaintiffs fail to
indicate in which direction they believe that defendant should
have attempted to turn under these circumstances. As we
view the evidence on which plaintiffs rely, it was sufficient
to warrant the application of the imminent peril doctrine
in favor of defendant (Peterson v. Devine, 68 Cal.App.2d
387, 392-393 [156 P.2d 936] ; Wilkerson v. Brown, 84 Cal.
App.2d 401, 408 [190 P.2d 958]), but was insufficient to
warrant the application of the last clear chance doctrine in
favor of plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs cite and rely upon certain decisions, in addition
to those heretofore mentioned, in which the last clear chance
doctrine has been applied. (Bonebrake v. McCormick, 35
Cal.2d 16 [215 P.2d 728]; Center v. Yellow Cab Co., 216
Cal. 205 [13 P.2d 918] ; Bragg v. Smith, 87 Cal.App.2d 11
[195 P.2d 546]; Root v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, 84 Cal.
App.2d 135 [190 P.2d 48] ; Gillette v. City of San Francisco,
58 Cal.App.2d 434 [136 P.2d 611]; Yates v. Morotti, 120
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Cal..App. 710 [8 P.2d 519] .) Many of these cases have presented close questions concerning the sufficiency of the evidence
to warrant the application of the doctrine, but they are all
distinguishable on their facts. In none of the cited authorities
was a through highway involved nor was there such a relation between the time, distance and speed factors as is
found in the present case. The language used in BagwiU v.
Pacific Electric R. Co., 90 Cal.App. 114, at page 121 [265
P. 517], is singularly applicable here:" Certainly the doctrine
of last clear chance never meant a splitting of seconds when
emergencies ·arise. . . . We are not to tear down the facts of
a case and rebuild the same so that, by a trimming down
and tight-fitting operation, something can be constructed upon
which may be fastened the claim of last clear chance. The
words mean exactly as they indicate, namely, last cle.ar chance,
not possible chance.''
' We therefore conclude that the record is devoid of substantial evidence to sustain the application of the last clear
chance doctrine, and that it was error for the trial court to
instruct the jury with respect thereto. (Wallis v. Southern
Pac. Co., 184 Cal. 662, 672 [195 P. 408, 15 A.L.R. 117);
Palmer v. TschtLdy, 191 Cal. 696, 700-7.01 [218 P. 36].) The
trial court therefore properly granted defendant's motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
'l'he judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., and Traynor, J.,
concurred.
SCHAUER, J., Concurring.-In my view there appears
no substantial and legally sound basis for distinguishing this
case, in favor of a reversal here and an affirmance there, from
Peterson v. Burkhalter (1951), 38 Cal.2d 107, 114 [237 P.2d
977]. In the interests of clarity of principle I think that the
last cited case should either be followed or expressly overruled. Since I believe that the Peterson case is erroneous, as
pointed out in my dissent (p. 114 of 38 Cal.2d), I would
overrule it. With such further statement of grounds I concur
in the opinion and judgment.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
The majority opinion in this case is contrary to the authorities, usurps the function of the jury and makes serious inroads
into the last clear chance doctrine.
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It is held that the doctrine is inapplicable because defendant did not, as a matter of law, have a chance to avoid
the accident by acting as a person of ordinance prudence. In
addition to his ability to stop, which is demonstrated by the
evidence, he could have swerved to the left and averted the
collision. The evidence shows that both cars were traveling
at about 40 miles per hour; that defendant saw the deceased
500 feet from the intersection; that when the latter was
30 feet from it defendant was 75 feet and decedent was
looking straight ahead and did not slow down at all, obviously
indicating to defendant that he would not stop at the stop
sign. Yet defendant applied his brakes only lightly, not
forcefully enough to stop his car and avoid a collision. The
accident occurred in the northeast part of the intersection
and decedent's car was struck at the left rear wheel and door.
The highway was 20 feet wide. No other cars were on the
highway. Defendant made no effort to swerve to the left
to avert the collision which he plainly could have done. Thus,
he had ample opportunity to avoid the collision either by
stopping or swerving. It was for the jury to say whether as
.a man of ordinary prudence he should have followed one course
or the other.
The majority opinion weighs the evidence and concludes
that there was no last clear chance by such statements as,
that defendant was entitled to assume decedent would stop
at the stop sign (the circumstances justified the jury in concluding that he was remiss if he made such assumption) and
that defendant was entitled to the imminent peril rule with
respect to swerving (whether there was such peril and he acted
as a man of ordinary prudence was an issue for the jury).
It is not the rule, as asserted by the majority, that the last
clear chance rule does not apply where two moving vehicles
are involved; the conclusion reached is contrary to the authorities in this state.
We said in Belinsky v. Olsen, 38 Cal.2d 102, 105, 106 [237
P.2d 645] : "It was for the jury to determine whether in the
space of time involved he could have avoided the collision.''
In Bonebrake v. McCormick, 35 Cal.2d 16 [215 P.2d 728],
this court reversed the trial court for refusal to instruct on
the doctrine where two moving vehicles were involved, decedent on a bicycle and defendant in a car following him and
the decedent turned to the left in the path of the car.
In Peterson v. Burkhalter, 38 Cal.2d 107 [237 P.2d 977],
the vehicles were both moving toward an intersection and
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would arrive there at the same time. The plaintiff was not
looking at defendant and a collision occurred. This court
said (p. 113): " . . . [T]here is ample evidence from which
the jury could determine that a reasonably prudent man,
knowing the facts of which Burkhalter was aware, should
have foreseen that Peterson might not turn or stop his motor
scooter. Under smh circumstances, it was negligent for Burkhalter to proceed toward the intersection acting upon a contrary assumption. . . . Considering the evidence in the Poncino case [relied upon by the majority], it does not stand
for the proposition that, as a matter of law, a defendant
with two seconds within which to avoid an accident had no
chance to do so. In a proper case, an appellate court might
say that the defendant did not have a chance which amounted
to a 'clear' one. But the rule should not be applied when
the only evidence is to the effect that the defendant could
have avoided the accident within the existing time and distance limitations.
''Burkhalter saw Peterson when 50 feet from the intersection. He estimated that he could stop his automobile within
10 or 15 feet. He did stop within 28 to 30 feet after the
impact, and testified that he could have done so sooner. All of
the evidence indicates that Burkhalter might have halted his
automobile at a much less distance than 50 feet.
"Moreover, Burkhalter's testimony reveals that he made
no attempt to avoid the accident by turning his automobile
or sounding his horn. It cannot be said, as a matter of law,
that he did not have sufficient time in which to do something,
and the jury properly might have found that sounding his
horn to attract the attention of Peterson would have constituted the exercise of reasonable care on his part to avert
the accident." (Italics added.) That case is indistinguishable
from the one at bar.
In Center v. Yellow Cab Co., 216 Cal. 205 [13 P.2d 918],
plaintiff, a pedestrian, was moving across the street not at a
crosswalk and defendant was driving on the street when his
car struck plaintiff. Plaintiff was not observing defendant's
approach. It was held defendant had a last clear chance to
avoid the accident by swerving, blowing his horn or stopping.
In Girdner v. Union Oil Co., 216 Cal. 197 [13 P.2d 915],
plaintiff drove across a main highway on a secondary crossroad looking away from defendant's car approaching the
intersection on the main highway. Defendant drove his car
into plaintiff's. This court pointed out that the trial court
1
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found that the evidence (p. 200) "established the fact that
when plaintiff approached and was proceeding across the path
of the oil truck, and up to the time of the collision, he did
not see and "'ras totally oblivious of the approach of the truck,
and the danger that confronted him; that defendant Elam
first saw plaintiff's car some forty or fifty feet away from the
intersection; that he saw plaintiff looking lJtraight ahead, in
an opposite direction, and not slowing the speed of his automobile; that Elam was traveling at a speed of twenty miles an
hour and could have stopped his truck almost immediately,
and 'vi thin a distance of a few feet; that he had ample time
and sufficient distance, at least twenty-five to thirty-five feet,
in which to stop and avoid coming in contact with plaintiff's
car, but failed to do so,'' and concluded that defendant could
have avoided the collision by stopping, swerving or blowing
his horn.
Chappell v. San Diego etc. Ry. Co., 201 Cal. 560 [258 P. 73],
involved a collision between two moving vehicles at an intersection of a street railway and street. The one on the tracks
was a gas motor railway car and the one on the street an
automobile. It appeared that defendant (operator of the
railway car) could have stopped when he first saw the car
approaching when 55 feet to 60 feet from the crossing. It appeared that plaintiff was approaching slowly and attempting
to stop. The court said (p. 565): "The verdict must be taken
as a finding that the defendant's car failed to stop as soon as it
was possible for it to have done so in the exercise of due care
and that the last act of negligence of the defendant was the
proximate cause of the injury. This it was the province of the
Jury to find under the instructions of the court relating to
the doctrine of the last clear chance." (Italics added.)
Podeszwa v. White, 99 Cal.App.2d 777 [222 P.2d 683], while
not involving the doctrine, is directly in point. Defendant
approached an intersection at 40 miles per hour on a through
highway and saw decedent's car approaching a stop sign at
the intersection at 10 miles per hour and did not stop but
continued across the highway. The court said (p. 779) : "Manifestly by a very slight swerve of his truck he could have
passed behind the coupe and avoided the accident. Furthermore, when he observed the coupe passing. the boulevard stop
sign and approaching the Orangethorpe pavement the application of his brakes would have slowed his truck sufficiently
to allow the coupe to pass in front of him. The fact that the
driver of the coupe did not make the boulevard stop as re-
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quired by law (Veh. Code, §§ 552, 577) did not justify
defendant in failing to reduce his speed or change the direction
of his car in an effort to avoid the accident.''
The basic principle is that it is for the trier of the fact
to determine whether defendant had a last clear chance to
avoid the collision and that is true where the evidence is
inconclusive or contradictory, or as stated: "It is not improper
to instruct the jury on the doctrine of 'last clear chance'
when, on any valid theory, there is substantial evidence to
support the application of that principle. ( Gardini v. Arakelian, 18 Cal.App.2d 424, 430 [ 64 P.2d 181].) In the case
entitled Wheeler v. Buerkle, H Cal.App.2d 368, 373 [58 P.2d
230], it was said that 'if the facts of a case do not bring
the doctrine into play the court must so decide,' and if the
facts be such that the doctrine rnay be applied, it is the duty
of a trial judge to submit it to a jury by proper instructions,
or to find upon it in the absence of a jury." (Wright v. Los
Angeles Ry. Corp., 14 Cal.2d168, 178 [93 P.2d135].) Here
there are three theories sustained by the evidence that defendant could have avoided the accident; he could have
stopped, swerved or sounded his horn.
In making the statement that the doctrine does not apply
to two moving vehicles approaching an intersection the majority cites Poncino v. Reid-Murdock & Co., 136 Cal.App. 223
[28 P.2d 932]. No citation of authority is made for that
statement in the Poncino case. A hearing in this court was
denied. As pointed out by this court in Peterson v. Burkhalter,
supra, 38 Cal.2d 107, that case was based upon the proposition that plaintiff was aware of the danger rather than that
defendant did not have an opportunity to avoid it; that was
the only basis for distinguishing it from Girdner v. Union
Oil Co., supra, 216. Cal. 197, and otherwise the case was in
effect overruled as being out of line with the Girdner case.
Johnson v. Sacramento Northern Ry., 54 Cal.App.2d 528
[129 P.2d 503), cited for the same proposition, cites in addition to the Poncino case, only cases dealing with railroad
crossing collisions where the courts have been reluctant to
apply the doctrine because of a feeling that a railroad company should not be expected to stop at crossings under any
circumstances. Certainly that is not true of automobiles approaching intersections. The same is true of Folger v. Richfield Oil Corp., 80 Cal.App.2d 655 [182 P.2d 337], Dalley
v. Williams, 73 Cal.App.2d 427 [166 P.2d 595], Berton v.
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Cochran, 81 Cal.App.2d 776 [185 P.2d 349], and Allin v.
Snavely, 100 Cal.App.2d 411 [224 P.2d 113], which make no
such statement. Moreover, as above seen, there are numerous
decisions by this court applying the doctrine to moving
vehicles.
There is no reason why it should not apply in such a
situation considering the speed with which automobiles are
now operated and the necessity for rapid reaction to avoid
accidents. Here we have a person (defendant) approaching
an intersection at 40 miles per hour. He sees another car
approaching at the same speed on the crossroad and the driver
of the car (decedent) does not observe him. When the other
car was at least 50 feet from the stop sign defendant was
no longer justified in assuming it would stop at the stop sign.
It is not reasonable to suppose that the driver of the other
car would at that point apply his brakes with full force and
come to a shrieking stop. Hence when the other car was at
that point the defendant had adequate opportunity to stop
his car or swerve from its path to avert the collision.
What was said by the District Court of Appeal in Bragg v.
Smith, 87 Cal.App.2d 11, at page 15 [195 P.2d 546], is
pertinent here: ''The defendant actually discovered the situation and realized the danger while it was still possible to
avoid ~the collision by the use of ordinary care on his part.
The opportunity was clearly open to him to avoid the accident
by turning either to his right or to his left. While it may
be true that he had to act quickly, it is not unusual for a
motorist to be confronted with such a necessity and it cannot
be said, as a matter of law, that a distance of approximately
100 feet was not sufficient to enable him to have a clear chance
to slightly alter the course of his vehicle. Common experience
is to the contrary, and the evidence here is sufficient to support
the court's finding that a last clear chance to avoid the accident existed after the defendant actually knew that the
plaintiff was in a position of danger from which he would
be unable to escape by any action which he could then take.
(Cady v. Sanford, 57 Cal.App. 218 [207 P. 45] .) "
It should be remembered that the trial court denied a
motion on behalf of defendant for a directed verdict and
submitted the case to the jury under appropriate instructions
applying the last clear chance doctrine, and the jury returned
a verdict in favor of plaintiffs from which it must be implied
that they determined as a fact that defendant had a last
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clear chance to avoid the collision after perceiving that decedent was in a position of peril. The trial court then granted
defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
Plaintiffs took an appeal from the judgment and the District
Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, by unanimous
opinion prepared by Mr. Justice Mussell and concurred in
by Mr. Presiding Justice Barnard and Mr. Justice Griffin
reversed the judgment and remanded the case to the trial
court with instructions to enter judgment in conformity with
the verdict of the jury. ( (Cal.App.) 238 P.2d 25.) The
opinion of the District Court of Appeal contains a correct
statement of the facts, is well reasoned and is supported by
abundant authority. The following statement is contained
in the concluding paragraph of the opinion: "We conclude
that there was substantial evidence to support the findings
of the jury and that the trial court erred in rendering a
judgment notwithstanding the verdict.''
From the foregoing it clearly appears that the trial judge
was of the opinion that the last clear chance doctrine was
applicable when he submitted the case to the jury and that
the jury found the facts necessary to support a verdict in
favor of the plaintiffs. Although the trial judge changed his
mind after the verdict was returned, it was the unanimous
opinion of the District Court of Appeal that the evidence
warranted the submission of the case to the jury and that
the question of whether or not the defendant had a last clear
chance to avoid the collision was one of fact and not of law,
and reversed the trial court.
The very recent case of Pfingsten v. W estenhaver, ante,
p. 12, at page 19 [224 P.2d 395], reannounced the well
settled rule that "Where different conclusions may reasonably
be drawn from the evidence by different minds the trial court's
(jury's) findings are not to be disturbed on appeal." (See,
also, Connor v. Owen, 28 Cal.App.2d 591, 592-593 [82 P.2d
1114].)
I do not believe it can fairly and honestly be said that
the record in this case presents a factual situation on which
reasonable minds cannot differ. What has happened thus
far demonstrates beyond question that reasonable minds have
arrived at different conclusions on the record before us. Such
being the case, under the well-settled doctrine, the issue is
one of fact and not of law, and hence should be determined
by the trier of fact-the jury in this case.
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While the majority opinion in this case will create great
confusion because it is in clear conflict with numerous other
decisions of this court and the District Courts of .Appeal
which I have cited hereinabove, of graver and more far-reaching concern is the problem that it is in direct violation of the
constitutional provision that ''the right of trial by jury shall
be secured to all, and remain inviolate''; (Cal. Const., art I,
§ 7). It cannot be doubted that where a factual situation
is presented in a case in which litigants are entitled to a jury
trial as a matter of right, and the court takes the case from
the jury and decides as a matter of law that there is no
issue of fact to be determined, the litigants have been deprived
of a jury trial, and the Constitution has been violated. Such
is the situation in the case at bar. While this result may seem
to be unimportant in this case, it has an insidious impact
on our whole constitutional structure. If judges who have
taken a solemn oath to support the Constitution can ruthlessly disregard its provisions, as the majority has done here,
why demand loyalty oaths from those holding positions of
lesser importance~
I would reverse the judgment and direct the trial court to
enter judgment on the verdict of the jury.
.Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied .August
7, 1952. Carter, J., was of the opinion that the petition
should be granted.

